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This chapter presents estimates of how a reemployment bonus
affected three different outcomes of policy interest: weeks of unem-
ployment insurance (UI) receipt during the benefit year, dollars of UI
received during the benefit year, and the percentage of persons who
exhaust their benefits.  An assessment of how the reemployment bonus
affected reemployment wages is made in Chapter 5.
To provide a deeper understanding of the reemployment bonus
effects, this chapter also presents impact estimates based on slightly
more involved computations.  As shown in Chapter 2 in the discussion
of the results of randomization (pp. 56–57), the characteristics of the
treatment and control groups were quite similar in the Washington and
Pennsylvania experiments; however, numerous statistically significant
differences existed between the control and treatment groups in Illi-
nois.  Since the control and treatment groups were not completely
homogenous, “regression adjustment” was done to account for differ-
ences between the treatments and controls in observable characteristics
and improve the precision of treatment impact estimates.
Taken together, the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington experi-
ments examined a wide variety of bonus levels and qualification period
lengths.  In the third section of this chapter, we examine the marginal
response to variations in these parameters.  The analysis is done using a
“continuous variables model” with the bonus amount and qualification
period entered linearly.1  Results are presented for the experiments sep-
arately and then for a pooled sample using evidence from all three.
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To examine how the bonus offers changed behavior regarding the
timing of unemployment, we present a hazard analysis of leaving
insured unemployment.  We then report treatment impacts in the three
experiments for various subgroups: treatment impact estimates are pre-
sented by gender, age, race, previous industry, area unemployment rate,
and weekly benefit entitlement.  Some evidence from the Washington
experiment about the effectiveness of the reemployment bonus for dis-
located workers is also presented.  The final section offers some con-
clusions.
Evidence from the three experiments suggests that a cash reem-
ployment bonus offer can be expected to modestly shorten the average
spell of insured unemployment, but the likely impacts seem to be too
small for the bonus offer to be an optimum strategy for reducing UI
costs.  A full cost-benefit analysis investigating this question is pro-
vided in Chapter 7.  No particular population subgroups had distinctly
stronger reactions to the bonus than other groups; however, the bonus
was more effective at times and places where the unemployment rate
was lower. 
TREATMENT IMPACTS ON INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT
The three experiments differed in the number and type of treat-
ments examined and in the samples given a bonus offer.   Figure 4.1
summarizes the characteristics of the treatment designs for the three
experiments (which are more fully described in Chapter 2).
While there was only a single claimant treatment in the Illinois
experiment—$500 for reemployment within 11 weeks on a job held 4
months—the availability of Federal Supplemental Compensation
(FSC) was ended about halfway through the enrollment period.  This
resulted in a “natural experiment” in which 53 percent of the claimants
offered a bonus in the Illinois experiment had a maximum entitled ben-
efit duration of 38 weeks, while the others had a maximum duration of
26 weeks.  According to Davidson and Woodbury (1991), the different
entitled durations lead to significantly different response to the bonus
offer.  We present estimates separately for the different duration entitle-
ment groups.
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Figure 4.1 Design of the Reemployment Bonus Offers
As described in Chapter 2, the four treatments in Pennsylvania
involved either a low or high bonus amount and either a short or a long
qualification period.  The low bonus (set at three times the weekly ben-
efit amount [WBA]) had a mean of $502, while the high bonus (set at 6
× WBA) had a mean of $1,000.  The short qualification period was set
at 6 weeks and the long qualification period was set at 12 weeks.  With
WBAs ranging from  $35 to $260, bonus offers in Pennsylvania ranged
from $105 to $1,560.  For all treatments in Pennsylvania, the reem-
ployment period was set at 16 weeks.
In Washington, there were three formulas for the bonus amount
(low, medium, and high) and two formulas for the qualification period
(short and long).  The bonus amounts were figured as 2, 4, or 6 times
the WBA, and the qualification periods were computed as either 20
percent or 40 percent of the entitled duration of benefits plus one
week.2  The mean low bonus amount offered was $307, the mean
medium amount was $615, and the mean high amount was $925.  The
A.  Illinois Job Search Incentive Experiment
Bonus amount Qualification period
$500 11 weeks
B.  Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Experiment
Qualification period
Bonus amount 6 weeks 12 weeks
3 × WBA Low bonus/short qual. Low bonus/long qual.
6 × WBA High bonus/short qual. High bonus/long qual.
C.  Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment
Qualification period
Bonus amount
(0.2 × potential UI duration) 
+ 1 week
(0.4 × potential UI duration) 
+ 1 week
2 × WBA Low bonus/short qual. Low bonus/long qual.
4 × WBA Med. bonus/short qual. Med. bonus/long qual.
6 × WBA High bonus/short qual. High bonus/long qual.
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mean short qualification period was 7 weeks, and the mean long quali-
fication period was 12 weeks.  The bonus offers in Washington ranged
from $110 to $1,254.  The reemployment period for all treatments was
set at four months.
For the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments we present esti-
mates of the impact of each separate offer.  For each of those experi-
ments, we give an estimate of the mean effect of the short-
qualification-period offers, the long-qualification-period offers, and the
different bonus level offers, as well as an estimate for each experiment
of the overall mean impact of all treatments.
Unadjusted Treatment Impacts
For a classically designed experiment involving random assign-
ment and large sample sizes, treatment impact estimates may be com-
puted as the simple difference between treatment and control group
means of outcome measures.  Simple experimental impact estimates
are not constrained by econometric models and may be very convinc-
ing and easy to understand if randomization was effective in creating
homogenous control and treatment group samples.  This simplicity is
one of the fundamental appeals of experiments for program evaluation.  
Table 4.1 presents unadjusted estimates of the response to the bonus
offer.  The overall mean estimates indicate that the bonus offer reduced
weeks of UI benefit receipt by 1.15 weeks in Illinois, 0.62 weeks in
Pennsylvania, and 0.34 weeks in Washington (Woodbury and Spiegel-
man 1987; Corson et al. 1992; O’Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995).
For Illinois and Pennsylvania, the null hypothesis of no impact can be
rejected at the 95 percent confidence level.  The estimates also show
that the bonus offer reduced UI benefits received by $194 in Illinois,
$81 in Pennsylvania, and $22 in Washington.  The bonus offer also
reduced the probability of UI benefit exhaustion by 3.3 percent in Illi-
nois, 0.8 percent in Pennsylvania, and 1.0 percent in Washington.3
This pattern of results—bonus impacts in Illinois being markedly
larger than those in Pennsylvania, and impacts in Pennsylvania being
somewhat larger than those in Washington—holds up throughout the
comparison of various measures of treatment impact across the three
experiments.  The relative impacts from the three experiments may be
examined in comparison to the parameters of the bonus offers.  The
Bonus Impacts on Receipt of UI 109
Table 4.1 Unadjusted Differences between Experimental and Control 







































































































































































































































a Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level; ** = statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
b The Illinois sample sizes for FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible do not sum to the total
Illinois sample size.  This discrepancy is due to the FSC eligibility conditions, which
differed depending on the date of the benefit claim, and our desire to use the largest
possible sample in the full sample analysis.  Further details are given in Chapter 3.
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average bonus offer as a multiple of the average WBA was 3.6 in Illi-
nois, 4.7 in Pennsylvania, and 3.8 in Washington.  The average qualifi-
cation period was 11.0 weeks in Illinois, 9.0 weeks in Pennsylvania,
and 8.4 weeks in Washington.  Pennsylvania had both an average bonus
which was a higher multiple of the average WBA and a longer average
qualification period than did Washington.  Pennsylvania also had an
average bonus which was a higher multiple of the average WBA than
Illinois, but the average qualification period in Pennsylvania was two
weeks shorter than the uniform 11-week qualification period in Illinois.
A variety of bonus levels and lengths of qualification periods were
tested in Pennsylvania and Washington.  The results found in each of
these separate experiments tends to corroborate the conclusion which
might be drawn from the above comparison of overall mean responses
across experiments.  For Pennsylvania, combining treatments with sim-
ilar WBA multiples yields two groups that differ in the level of the
bonus offer but have the same mean qualification period; a similar
exercise yields three bonus level groups for Washington.  For both
Pennsylvania and Washington, the only combinations estimated with
statistical significance are the high bonus treatments combined across
qualification periods.  For Pennsylvania, the high bonus offers had a
mean impact of –0.71 weeks across qualification periods, while in
Washington the mean impact of the high bonus treatments was –0.67.
In both experiments, these impact estimates are greater than the point
estimates for the lower bonus multiples.  When the responses to the
short and long qualification periods in Pennsylvania and Washington
are compared, the estimated response to the long qualification period is
statistically significantly greater than for the short qualification period.
The largest and most statistically significant impact estimates in both
Pennsylvania and Washington were for the high-bonus-multiple/long-
qualification-period treatments, with the effect on UI compensation
being –0.95 weeks in Pennsylvania and –0.73 weeks in Washington.  
An interesting sub-analysis involves the natural experiment with
varying entitled duration of benefits in Illinois.  The average bonus
response of –1.15 weeks of benefits was made up of a response of –1.78
weeks for those eligible for FSC (38 weeks of benefit entitlement) and
–0.71 weeks for those not eligible (26 weeks of benefit entitlement).
The average response of –0.71 for the FSC-ineligible sample in Illinois
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is close to the response observed in Pennsylvania and Washington,
where the entitled duration of benefits was also similar.
When the Illinois FSC-ineligible results are compared with the
findings in Pennsylvania and Washington, the patterns of bonus offer
impacts on the UI exhaustion rate within and across the three experi-
ments are also similar.  The mean FSC-ineligible impact was –1.5
percent in Illinois, –0.8 percent in Pennsylvania, and in –1.0 in Wash-
ington.  The overall impact on exhaustions in Illinois was –3.3 per-
cent, with the impact for the FSC-eligible group in Illinois an
astounding –5.4 percent.  For the high bonus/long qualification treat-
ments, the impact on exhaustion of benefits was –2.6 percent in Penn-
sylvania and –2.3 percent in Washington.  In Illinois and for the high
bonus/long qualification treatments in Pennsylvania and Washington,
the reductions in exhaustion rate were statistically significant, indicat-
ing that some participants dramatically changed behavior by moving
from benefit exhaustion to relatively short-term unemployment.  The
same general pattern of bonus offer impacts is observed on dollars of
UI in the benefit year; however, the results in Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington were relatively weak compared with estimated impacts on the
other outcomes.4
Adjusted Treatment Impacts
If treatment-control differences in outcome variables are due to
factors other than the treatment, a simple comparison of means may
not be adequate to identify treatment effects.  As discussed in Chapter
2, for the Washington experiment there were no more differences
between treatment and control groups in observable characteristics
than would be expected to result from a random assignment process.
Unfortunately, the variables on which there were the most pronounced
differences—WBA and base period earnings (BPE)—may have
affected the measurement of outcomes of interest.
An alternative procedure for computing the simple difference
between treatment and control means on an outcome variable of inter-
est that yields the same result involves estimating
(4.1) Y = a + TB + u,
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by ordinary least squares regression.  In this equation the intercept, a,
is the mean value of the outcome variable, Y, for the control group. T is
a matrix of dummy variables representing the treatments, and u is a
normally distributed mean zero error term.  The parameter vector B
contains estimates of the simple differences between treatment and
control means on the outcome variable.
The model used to estimate treatment impacts while holding other
factors constant is a straightforward generalization of Equation 4.1.
The specification for computing adjusted treatment impacts involves
adding terms for concomitant variables and is referred to as a covari-
ance model.  In the present case it takes the form
(4.2) Y = a + TB + ZC + u,
where the introduction of concomitant variables, Z, into the model
reduces the experimental error caused by differences in the observable
characteristics between the control and treatment groups.5  When esti-
mating this model, each concomitant variable is included as a deviation
from its own mean, thereby allowing interpretation of the intercept as
the mean value of the outcome variable Y for the control group given
the mean observable characteristics of the whole sample.6  By this
approach, the vector B yields estimates of treatment impacts adjusted
for differences across observations in the characteristics Z.
Investigation into the causes of the lack of homogeneity in the
observable characteristics of the experimental and control groups in the
Washington sample indicated that treatment impacts estimated without
adjusting for the heterogeneity of the groups are likely to be biased.
Variations in the WBA accounted for most of the important heteroge-
neity across the Washington groups.  In particular, it was found that
omission of WBA when estimating treatment effects on dollars of UI
compensation in Washington is likely to yield biased impact estimates.
Nonetheless, to avoid any possibility of omitted variable bias in esti-
mating adjusted treatment impacts, a full set of concomitant or adjust-
ment variables is included as covariates in estimation of treatment
effects for Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington.7
The introduction of adjustment variables as covariates reduced the
standard errors on parameter estimates, with a greater effect on dollars
of UI compensation than the other outcomes (Table 4.2).  The mean
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Table 4.2 Adjusted Differences between Experimental and Control 


































































































































































































































a Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level; ** = statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
b The Illinois sample sizes for FSC-eligible and FSC-ineligible do not sum to the total
Illinois sample size.  This discrepancy is due to the FSC eligibility conditions, which
differed depending on the date of the benefit claim, and our desire to use the largest
possible sample size in the full sample analysis.  Further details are given in Chapter 3.
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regression-adjusted response across all treatments to a bonus offer was
a reduction of $150 in Illinois, $102 in Pennsylvania, and $63 in Wash-
ington.  The Illinois and Pennsylvania estimates are significant at the
95 percent confidence level, while the Washington estimate is signifi-
cant at the 90 percent confidence level.  The adjusted impact estimates
are somewhat larger for Pennsylvania and Washington and somewhat
smaller in Illinois than the unadjusted estimates, but in no case is the
adjusted estimate significantly different from the unadjusted estimate. 
Regression adjustment of impact estimates has the greatest effect on
the high bonus/long qualification treatments in Pennsylvania (–$133)
and Washington (–$135).  Both estimates are statistically significant and
larger than the unadjusted estimates, but they are not significantly dif-
ferent from the unadjusted estimates.8
Regression-adjusted estimates of the bonus impact on weeks of UI
and benefit exhaustion were only modestly changed from the unad-
justed estimates.  The overall regression-adjusted mean estimates indi-
cate that the bonus offer reduced UI benefit receipt by 1.04 weeks in
Illinois, 0.58 weeks in Pennsylvania, and 0.40 weeks in Washington.
The mean regression-adjusted estimate of the reduction in the probabil-
ity of UI benefit exhaustion was 2.6 percent in Illinois, 0.4 percent in
Pennsylvania, and 1.4 percent in Washington.
For Washington, where lack of homogeneity was most severe,
regression adjustment allowed detection of statistically significant
impacts on compensation and weeks for three of the individual
treatments at the 95 percent level of confidence, whereas not a single
treatment impact on dollars of compensation was estimated with
significance before regression adjustment.
A CONTINUOUS VARIABLES MODEL OF 
TREATMENT RESPONSE
In both Pennsylvania and Washington the bonus amount was
defined in terms of the WBA.  Since the WBA varies widely across
claimants, the bonus amount may be used as a continuous variable
when estimating bonus impacts.  In Pennsylvania the qualification
period was set at either 6 or 12 weeks, while in Washington it was
defined as either 20 or 40 percent of the entitled duration of benefits
plus 1 week.  Therefore, the qualification period may also be used as a
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continuous variable.  The variation in the bonus amount and qualifica-
tion period in Pennsylvania and Washington is sufficient to allow esti-
mation of the impact of incremental changes in the values of these
parameters of a bonus offer.  This section presents estimates from con-
tinuous variables models of bonus impacts for the separate Pennsylva-
nia and Washington experiments and for these experiments combined
with data from the Illinois experiment.  
The continuous variables models represent a bonus offer as a given
dollar amount paid for reemployment within a certain number of
weeks.  (These models are called continuous variables models because
the treatments are represented by continuous variables rather than dis-
crete indicator variables.)  These models allow estimation of the effect
of incremental changes in the bonus amount and the qualification
period.  The estimating equations have the following general linear
specification:
(4.3) Y = a + b1B + b2Q + ZC + u,
where, B is the bonus amount in dollars, Q is the qualification period
length in weeks, and Z is a set of concomitant or adjustment variables
centered around their mean.9  The parameters to be estimated are a, b1,
b2, and C.  The random error term, u, is assumed to be normally distrib-
uted with mean zero.  In Equation 4.3, B and Q take on the value of
zero for members of the control group.  Including the WBA as a con-
trol variable improves the within-treatment homogeneity of B and
results in the parameter b1 being estimated using variation in B across
the treatments.  The same effect is achieved in estimating the parameter
on Q by including the entitled duration of benefits.  Parameter esti-
mates for Equation 4.3 are presented in Table 4.3 for five samples.  The
dependent variable for each regression model is weeks compensated in
the benefit year.  
In the models estimated separately on the Pennsylvania and the
Washington samples, none of the parameter estimates on B nor Q are
statistically significant.  For the sample formed by pooling data from
the two experiments, however, the standard errors on the estimated
parameters on B and Q are smaller and the parameter on the bonus
amount, B, is estimated with statistical significance.  The pattern and
magnitude of results is consistent across the Pennsylvania and Wash-
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ington samples; a higher bonus amount and a longer qualification
period both reduce the weeks of UI drawn in the benefit year by similar
magnitudes.
Evidence from the pooled Pennsylvania and Washington sample
suggests that a $100 increase in a bonus offer will reduce weeks of UI
compensation in the benefit year by an average of 0.039 weeks, and a
1-week increase in the qualification period will reduce weeks of UI
compensation in the benefit year by 0.026.  These parameters, esti-
mated on the combined data, have sampling errors about 50 percent
smaller than parameters estimated on the separate samples.  Using
results of the pooled estimation, response to the bonus offer in Pennsyl-
vania and Washington may be summarized by saying that with a 12-
week qualification period, it would take a bonus of nearly $1,800 to
induce an average 1-week decline in insured unemployment among








































a Standard errors are in parentheses. * = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level in a two-tailed test;  ** = statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in a
two-tailed test.
b The Pennsylvania estimates were computed in a regression model which also
included cohort indicators, office indicators, and demographic and economic vari-
ables.  The Washington estimates were computed in a regression model which also
included the WBA and the entitled duration of benefits.  The pooled sample estimates
were estimated in regressions which included cohort indicators, office indicators,
indicators for Washington, Pennsylvania, and Illinois FSC where possible, and demo-
graphic and economic variables.
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those offered a bonus.  To appreciate the meaning of this, recall that
about 12.9 percent of those offered a bonus in Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington actually were paid a bonus (Table 3.1 in Chapter 3).10  This
means that, on average, it cost about $232 in bonus payments to save a
week of UI benefit payments, which averaged about $159.11
For Illinois, because there is no variation in either the bonus
amount or the qualification period, the separate influence of these
parameters may not be estimated using a sample with data only from
Illinois.  Nonetheless, these effects may be inferred by combining the
Illinois data with that from the other experiments.  Adding the Illinois
data to the combined Pennsylvania and Washington sample yields a
total sample of nearly 36,000 UI beneficiaries.  As seen in Table 4.3,
combining the Illinois data with that from Pennsylvania and Washing-
ton results in an estimated increased effect of the qualification period
and a reduced effect of the dollar bonus amount.  In a formal statistical
sense, however, the parameter estimates on the dollar bonus amount
and the qualification period are not affected by adding the Illinois data
to the Washington and Pennsylvania data.12
It was previously noted that the Illinois beneficiaries who were
FSC-ineligible, and therefore had an initial benefit entitlement of 26
weeks, responded to the bonus offer in much the same way as benefi-
ciaries in Pennsylvania and Washington.  When the FSC-eligible group
is excluded from the three-state sample, the results of estimating the
continuous variables model indicate that the qualification period has a
diminished impact on benefit duration.  This impact is more in line
with the combined Pennsylvania and Washington impact; however,
even with the FSC-eligible group excluded, the impact of the dollar
bonus amount for the three-state sample remains somewhat smaller
than for the Pennsylvania and Washington sample.  Even though there
appears to be some underlying differences between Illinois and the
other two experiments, the results of estimating the continuous vari-
ables model on the combined sample excluding the Illinois FSC-eligi-
ble group probably provides the best summary of bonus response
across the three experiments.  
In Table 4.4 we present estimates of the reduction in weeks of UI
receipt for four hypothetical bonus offers based on parameter estimates
for the sample formed by pooling data from Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington together with the FSC-ineligible sample from Illinois.  The fol-
120 Decker, O’Leary, and Woodbury
lowing four hypothetical bonus offers are examined: 1) $500 for
reemployment within 6 weeks, 2) $1000 for reemployment within 6
weeks, 3) $500 for reemployment within 12 weeks, and 4) $1000 for
reemployment within 12 weeks.  For wage and benefit levels prevailing
during the 1980s, these four hypothetical bonus offers span the range of
policy-relevant bonus options reasonably approximated by use of a lin-
ear model.
As shown in Table 4.4, weeks of UI benefit receipt are predicted to
decline for each of the separate hypothetical bonus offers.  Further-
more, the impact on UI receipt of a hypothetical bonus offer increases
as the bonus amount or the duration of the bonus increases.  All of the
impact estimates computed using this simulation methodology are sig-
nificant at the 99 percent confidence level.  The least generous hypo-
thetical bonus offer—$500 with a six-week qualification period—
would reduce UI receipt by one-third of a week.  Since the continuous
variables model involves a linear relationship between the bonus
parameters and UI receipt, doubling the bonus amount and duration
simply doubles the impact of the bonus offer on UI receipt.  As shown
Table 4.4 The Predicted Impactsa of Four Hypothetical Bonus Offers on 
UI Receipt, Based on a Continuous Variables Model Estimated 
on the Pooled Pennsylvania, Washington, and Illinois Datab
Hypothetical
bonus offer
Amount of the 
bonus offer 
($)
Bonus qual. period 
(weeks)
Impact on weeks 
of UI benefits
1 500 6 –0.34***
(0.09)
2 1,000 6 –0.47***
(0.16)
3 500 12 –0.54*** 
(0.15)
4 1,000 12 –0.68*** 
(0.17)
a Predicted impacts are based on the regression-adjusted impact estimates presented in
Table 4.3 for the pooled Pennsylvania, Washington, and Illinois FSC-ineligible sam-
ple, which included 30,829 observations.
b Standard errors of predicted impacts in parentheses.  *** = Statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level in a two-tailed test.
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in Table 4.4, the offer with a $1,000 bonus amount and 12-week quali-
fication period has twice the impact of the offer with a $500 bonus
amount and 6-week qualification period.  Hypothetical bonus offers 2
and 3, which combine a high dollar amount with a short qualification
period or a low dollar amount with a long qualification period, would
be likely to reduce UI receipt by a greater amount than the least gener-
ous offer but less than the most generous offer.  
The offers reviewed in Table 4.4 are summarized graphically along
with all other possible dollar bonus amounts for the 6- and 12-week
qualification periods in Figure 4.2.  The figure makes plain the linear
nature of the impact response surface estimated.  It is also clear from
the diagram that, for any given dollar bonus amount, there will be a
greater response the longer the qualification period and, for any given
qualification period, there will be a greater response the higher the dol-
lar bonus amount.  The illustration does, however, mask the seemingly
different way that Illinois beneficiaries respond to the parameters of the
bonus in comparison with benefit recipients in Pennsylvania and Wash-
ington.13
THE TIMING OF TREATMENT IMPACTS
We now consider the impact of bonus offers on the time pattern of
ending receipt of UI benefits.  To understand this pattern, we examine
the cumulative UI exit rate.14  Since UI continued claim forms must be
filed every two weeks by claimants wishing to continue benefit receipt,
we analyze patterns over time measured in two-week intervals. 
Estimates of cumulative UI exit rates through the end of any time
period, t, are computed by dividing the difference between the initial
risk pool of UI claimants and the remaining number of UI claimants at
the start of time period t +1 by the initial risk pool of UI claimants.
The algebraic formula for the computation is simply:
(4.4) c(t) = (R0 – Rt + 1)/R0
In this formula R0 is the initial number of UI benefit recipients in
the separate treatment and control groups, and Rt + 1 is the number of UI
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Figure 4.2 Linearized Effect of the Bonus Offer on Benefit Year 
UI Weeks
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recipients in these groups at the start of time period t + 1.  Throughout
our discussion of the timing of treatment response, we focus on the first
spell of UI benefit receipt that followed the initial claim for UI benefits.
In none of the three experiments did as many as 5 percent of initial
claimants have multiple spells of UI benefit receipt during their benefit
year.
Cumulative exit rates for treatment and control groups for each of
the three experiments are reported in Table 4.5 observed at  two-week
intervals for unemployment spells between 1 and 39 weeks in duration.
This number of periods is considered because the longest entitled dura-
tion of benefits among the experiments was 38 weeks for FSC-eligible
claimants in Illinois.
To clearly understand the ideas involved consider an example from
Table 4.5.  The cumulative UI exit rate through the fifth week in the
benefit year for control subjects in Pennsylvania was 0.403.  This
means that out of 8,834 initial UI recipients, 40.3 percent of the control
group had stopped drawing UI benefits by the start of the sixth week of
their claim.  The comparable percentage among those offered a bonus
in Pennsylvania was 42.4.  The difference in these cumulative UI exit
rates was found to be statistically significant.
There is a common pattern in the cumulative UI exit rates across
the three experiments.  Cumulative exit rates are higher among the
treatment groups, at least through the first several weeks of UI receipt.
However, the general level of UI exit rates is considerably lower in Illi-
nois than in either Pennsylvania or Washington and tends to be slightly
lower in Pennsylvania than in Washington.15  Four factors might
account for these differences: 1) differences in the labor market struc-
tures of the three states (that is, differences in the mix of industries and
occupations), 2) differences in demand for labor among the three
states, 3) differences among the three states in the administration of UI,
and 4) differences among the three states in the characteristics of work-
ers who are eligible for UI. 
An effective bonus offer would lead claimants in treatment groups
to have higher UI exit rates than controls during the period over which
the bonus could be earned.  Comparison of exit rates for the control
and treatment groups in Illinois clearly shows that exit rates were
higher during the bonus qualification period for UI claimants who were
offered the bonus.  
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Initial risk set 3,952 4,186 2,106 2,337
Spell length (weeks)
0–1 0.127 0.150** 0.138 0.154
2–3 0.197 0.230** 0.215 0.249**
4–5 0.252 0.287** 0.271 0.307**
6–7 0.298 0.343** 0.322 0.370**
8–9 0.339 0.389** 0.364 0.417**
10–11 0.372 0.427** 0.396 0.458**
12–13 0.406 0.460** 0.422 0.484**
14–15 0.432 0.488** 0.443 0.509**
16–17 0.457 0.513** 0.466 0.531**
18–19 0.483 0.537** 0.487 0.548**
20–21 0.515 0.559** 0.508 0.569**
22–23 0.541 0.584** 0.528 0.590**
24–25 0.578 0.616** 0.556 0.615**
26–27 0.816 0.833** 0.661 0.709**
28–29 0.825 0.843** 0.674 0.724**
30–31 0.835 0.853** 0.690 0.740**
32–33 0.841 0.859** 0.702 0.749**
34–35 0.851 0.869** 0.720 0.767**
36–37 0.863 0.877* 0.744 0.780**
38–39 0.998 0.997 0.996 0.995






Initial risk set 3,392 8,834 3,073
Spell length (weeks)
0–1 0.258 0.271 0.273
2–3 0.343 0.355 0.357
4–5 0.403 0.424** 0.428**
6–7 0.456 0.486** 0.487**
8–9 0.515 0.538** 0.542**
10–11 0.564 0.587** 0.591**
12–13 0.608 0.635** 0.649**
14–15 0.647 0.671** 0.681**
16–17 0.681 0.701** 0.713**
18–19 0.708 0.726* 0.740**
20–21 0.734 0.750* 0.763**
22–23 0.759 0.773* 0.786**
24–25 0.787 0.797 0.810**
26–27 0.986 0.989* 0.991*
28–29 0.993 0.993 0.993
30–31 0.994 0.994 0.994
32–33 0.995 0.995 0.995
34–35 0.995 0.996 0.996
36–37 0.996 0.996 0.997
38–39 0.997 0.996 0.997
(continued)







Initial risk set 2,702 11,052 1,358
Spell length (weeks)
0–1 0.206 0.196 0.221
2–3 0.333 0.337 0.364*
4–5 0.431 0.437 0.464**
6–7 0.506 0.508 0.526
8–9 0.564 0.563 0.588
10–11 0.611 0.613 0.653**
12–13 0.644 0.650 0.684**
14–15 0.679 0.681 0.720**
16–17 0.715 0.720 0.758**
18–19 0.748 0.756 0.781**
20–21 0.784 0.792 0.816**
22–23 0.813 0.821 0.838*
24–25 0.838 0.850 0.862**
26–27 0.862 0.873 0.888**
28–29 0.885 0.899** 0.909**
30–31 0.982 0.982 0.980
32–33 0.989 0.989 0.987
34–35 0.993 0.991 0.992
36–37 0.994 0.993 0.993
38–39 0.995 0.994 0.994
a * = Cumulative hazard rate significantly different from control group in a two-tailed
test at the 90% confidence level; ** = cumulative hazard rate significantly different
from control group in a two-tailed test at the 95% confidence level.
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For the Pennsylvania experiment, the cumulative UI exit rate for
the treatment groups taken as a whole was higher than for the control
group through most of the bonus qualification period.  Compared with
Illinois, cumulative impacts appeared to be smaller, but were neverthe-
less big enough to produce a 0.62-week reduction in insured unem-
ployment (as reported in Table 4.1).  The cumulative impacts for the
high bonus/long qualification treatment in Pennsylvania were modestly
larger over the first 14 weeks following the start of UI benefits (Table
4.5, Pennsylvania, high bonus/long qualification). 
In the Washington experiment, there is scant statistical evidence
that bonus-offered workers gave up their UI benefits at a faster pace
than did the control group.  When all treatments are taken together, UI
exit rates were higher for bonus-offered workers than for controls only
by the week 28–29 period.  This is consistent with the small (and statis-
tically insignificant) 0.3-week reduction in insured unemployment that
can be seen in Table 4.1 for the mean bonus offer.  Isolating the most
effective treatment in Washington, the high-bonus/long-qualification
treatment (Table 4.5) there is some evidence that UI exit rates of the
bonus-offered workers were higher than the exit rates of the control
group.  These results are consistent with the somewhat larger reduction
in insured unemployment for this group (0.73 week) that can be seen in
Table 4.1.
The basic conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of cumulative
exit rates is that the Illinois and Pennsylvania bonus offers taken as a
whole both acted to increase UI exit rates during their respective bonus
qualification periods.  There is also some evidence that the high bonus
offers in the Washington experiment increased UI exit rates.  These
time patterns of cumulative exit rates for treatment and control subjects
are presented graphically in Figure 4.3.  Treatment impacts on cumula-
tive exit rates are presented graphically in Figure 4.4, where the esti-
mated impact is equal to the difference between the cumulative exit
rate for the treatment group and the cumulative exit rate for the control
group.
Cumulative UI exit rates are also useful for examining the extent to
which the workers who took advantage of bonus offers were individu-
als who otherwise would have exhausted their benefits.  For potential
benefit exhausters, each bonus offer accepted would generate a large
reduction in observed unemployment.  In Illinois, for example, the
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reduction would be from 27 weeks of insured unemployment to at most
11 weeks.  On the other hand, for workers who would have otherwise
had relatively short durations of UI benefit receipt, each bonus offer
accepted might generate only a relatively small reduction in observed
unemployment.
After 11 weeks, 37.2 percent of the claimants in the Illinois control
group had stopped receiving UI benefits, whereas 42.7 percent of the
Illinois treatment group had stopped receiving benefits (Table 4.5).  In
other words, at the end of the bonus qualification period, an additional
5.5 percentage points (42.7 – 37.2) of the bonus-offered workers had
ended their UI receipt as compared with the controls.  Moreover, this
5.5 percentage point difference diminishes only slightly after the end of
the bonus qualification period.  Even immediately before exhaustion of
regular UI benefits (weeks 24–25), the difference is nearly 4 percent-
age points.  In other words, the control group fails to catch up with the
treatment group in terms of exit from UI.  This failure of the control
and treatment cumulative exit rates to converge suggests that a large
proportion of the workers who responded to the Illinois bonus offer
would have had long spells of insured unemployment in the absence of
the bonus offer.  These results are consistent with estimates in Table
4.1, which show that the Illinois bonus reduced the UI benefit exhaus-
tion rate by over 3 percentage points overall (and by over 5 percentage
points among FSC-eligibles).  Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate that cumu-
lative UI exit rates for treatment subjects remain above controls at 26
weeks and at 38 weeks for the FSC-eligible group.  We conclude that
the Illinois bonus reduced the duration of UI spells among workers
who tended to have relatively long expected durations of UI receipt.
The evidence from Pennsylvania exhibits a different pattern.  The
difference between the control and combined treatment cumulative exit
rates peaks at between 2 and 3 percentage points during weeks 6–7 and
12–13 (Table 4.5 and Figures 4.3 and 4.4).  These peaks in cumulative
UI exit coincided with the end of the short (6-week) and the long (12-
week) bonus qualification periods.  For the high bonus/long qualifica-
tion treatment alone, the difference is larger, peaking at about 4 per-
centage points in weeks 12–13.  Unlike for Illinois, however, the
control and treatment cumulative exit rates do converge near the end of
the qualification period.  In terms of leaving UI, the control group
caught up with the combined treatment groups by weeks 24–25 (the
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Figure 4.3 Cumulative UI Exit Rates by Treatment and Control Groups
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Figure 4.3 (cont.)
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Figure 4.3 (cont.)
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Figure 4.4 Simple Treatment Impacts on Cumulative UI Exit Rates
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Figure 4.4 (cont.)
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Figure 4.4 (cont.)
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time period before exhaustion), but not until weeks 28–29 (just after
benefit exhaustion) for the high-bonus/long-qualification treatment in
Pennsylvania.
The decaying impact of the Pennsylvania treatments on the cumu-
lative UI exit rate shows that much of the bonus-induced reduction in
UI receipt occurred because the bonus effect was concentrated among
claimants who would have had relatively short spells of UI receipt.
The exception is the high bonus/long qualification treatment in Penn-
sylvania, which reduced the probability of a worker exhausting UI ben-
efits by 2.6 percent as reported in Table 4.1.  The point can also be seen
in Table 4.5, which shows that in weeks 24–25 there is still a 2.3 per-
centage point difference between the cumulative exit rates of the con-
trol group and the high bonus/long qualification treatment group.
Overall, though, the Pennsylvania treatments appear to have affected
the behavior mainly of workers with relatively low expected durations
of UI receipt.
The cumulative UI exit rate results for Washington show a weaker,
but similar, pattern to that seen in Pennsylvania.  For all treatments
combined, the bonus initially creates an insignificant difference
between the cumulative UI exit rates of the control and the experimen-
tal groups which diminishes before weeks 28–29 (the period before
exhaustion).  The exception is the high bonus/long qualification treat-
ment, for which the cumulative UI exit rate remains 2.4 percentage
points greater than controls in weeks 28–29 (Table 4.5).  This is con-
sistent with the significant 2.3 percentage point reduction in UI
exhaustion reported in Table 4.1 for those with the high bonus/long
qualification offer.  The evidence indicates that the average Washing-
ton bonus offer reduced the UI receipt of workers who would have
experienced relatively short spells of UI receipt in any event.  The
exception presented for Washington is the high bonus/long qualifica-
tion offer, which reduced benefit exhaustion.
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IMPACTS OF THE BONUS OFFER ON 
POPULATION SUBGROUPS
There are two main reasons for examining treatment impacts by
population subgroup.  One is to provide information to policymakers
who may consider targeting a reemployment bonus program to certain
groups, such as dislocated workers or older UI claimants.  Another is to
identify possible biases in the effects—a program that benefits only
one gender or certain ethnic groups may not be considered good policy
even if it is cost-effective.  
This section reports on treatment impacts for 12 subgroups defined
by binary variables for six characteristics: gender, age, race, industry,
area unemployment, and the WBA level.  The dummy variables speci-
fied for the analysis were a variable indicating whether a claimant was
female; an age variable indicating whether the claimant was 35 years
old or over; a race variable indicating whether a claimant was black; an
industry variable indicating whether the claimant’s previous job was in
manufacturing; an unemployment variable indicating whether the local
unemployment rate was below 5 percent; and a variable indicating
whether the claimant qualified for the maximum WBA. 
It is standard practice to examine program impacts by gender, age,
and race.  We investigated differential treatment impacts by industry,
area unemployment, and WBA for various reasons.  Because manufac-
turing is a shrinking sector, workers leaving manufacturing are more
likely than others to be displaced workers.  Accordingly, examining
impacts for manufacturing workers separately from others may shed
light on the value of the reemployment bonus as a way of aiding dis-
placed workers.  Because the reemployment bonus could be imple-
mented either as an ongoing or as a countercyclical program, it was
important to examine whether the bonus had an impact only when
reemployment prospects were good.  Finally, existing evidence sug-
gests that the disincentive effects of UI are greatest for workers whose
prior earnings were relatively low; these claimants who typically have
WBAs below the state maximum receive benefits which tend to replace
a larger share of lost earnings.  Accordingly, it seemed important to
examine whether workers below the maximum WBA had greater treat-
ment impacts than other workers.  If so, then the reemployment bonus
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might be an effective way of mitigating the disincentive effects of the
UI system for workers who are most adversely affected.
We estimate all subgroup treatment impacts in a single regression
model.  This means that the treatment response for each subgroup is
estimated controlling for the influence of all other subgroup character-
istics.  For example, the model estimates the treatment impacts associ-
ated with being black controlling for the fact that blacks are less likely
to be at the maximum WBA, less likely to claim benefits in areas with
unemployment rates below five percent, and so on.  If we did not pro-
ceed in this way, any differential impact associated with being black
might be a result not of being black but rather of other characteristics
that blacks possess.
The equation estimated for each outcome of interest is a straight-
forward generalization of Equation 4.2:
(4.5) Y = a + TB + ZC + GD + GTE' + GZF' + ZTH' + u
where Y is the outcome measure (either weeks of insured unemploy-
ment, dollars of UI compensation, or the UI benefit exhaustion rate); T
is the matrix of treatment dummies; Z is a matrix of concomitant vari-
ables in deviation form; G is the matrix of dummy variables which
code for membership in a subgroup; a is the intercept; B, C, D, E, F,
and H are conformable parameter vectors, and u is a normally distrib-
uted random error term with mean of zero.  Note that Equation 4.5 is
written to include concomitant variables, Z, that may have been corre-
lated with assignment to treatment and control groups.  In the models
estimated for all three experiments, the concomitant variables, Z, were
entered linearly and interacted with all subgroup dummies.16
Equation 4.5 specifies a complete one-way interaction model—that
is, all first-order products of subgroup dummy variables, treatment
indicators, and concomitant variables with each other are included.
This model allows simultaneous estimation of all subgroup treatment
impacts, but imposes linear restrictions on those estimates.17
Table 4.6 displays the estimated bonus impacts on weeks of
insured unemployment, dollars of UI benefits received, and the UI
exhaustion rate for each of the 12 subgroups.  Inspection of these
results reveals one main finding: there is virtually no difference
between any pair of subgroups shown that is both statistically signifi-













































































































































































































































































a Standard errors in parentheses.  *  = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level for a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95% con-
fidence level for a two-tailed test; # = statistically different from the complementary subgroup at the 90% confidence level for a two-tailed test; ## = sta-
tistically different from the complementary subgroup at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tailed test.
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cant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three
experiments.  The implication of this finding is quite striking.  The
reemployment bonus has a remarkably even impact on various sub-
groups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age, race, sector of
employment, local unemployment rate, or maximum WBA eligibility. 
The evidence suggests some differences that may be worth noting,
however.  For example, the evidence from Illinois and Pennsylvania
(but not from Washington) suggests that women may be slightly more
responsive than men to the reemployment bonus.  This is consistent
with research on female labor supply, which has found higher labor
supply elasticities for women than for men, meaning that women’s
attachment to the labor force is more flexible than men’s. 
Results from Illinois and Pennsylvania (but again not from Wash-
ington) also suggest that younger workers may be somewhat more
responsive than older workers to the reemployment bonus.  An expla-
nation for younger workers’ relatively larger response is similar to that
given for women—younger workers’ labor force attachment is more
flexible than older workers’.
There is no evidence to suggest that the reemployment bonus had a
different impact on African Americans compared to other racial or eth-
nic subgroups.  Impact estimation for each experiment was also done
using a further disaggregation by race and ethnicity.  The results sug-
gested that the response of blacks differed from the overall mean
response to a bonus offer by more than any other racial or ethnic sub-
group.  Yet, there were no significant differences between any of the
more finely defined groups.  In short, the impact of the reemployment
bonuses did not vary by race or ethnicity.
In Pennsylvania and Washington, claimants whose previous jobs
were in manufacturing had a stronger response to the bonus offer than
workers whose previous job was not in manufacturing, with the differ-
ence in impact across groups being statistically significant in Pennsyl-
vania.  It may be the case that claimants who had lost a job in
manufacturing tended to wait longer for recall, so that the bonus has
more possibility to alter search behavior.  However, this result is not
obtained in Illinois, where the impact was even slightly greater for
workers whose previous jobs were outside of manufacturing.  Overall,
there is no clear evidence for differential impacts across these sub-
groups.
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The results from both the Pennsylvania and Washington experi-
ments (although not from Illinois) suggest that UI claimants in low
unemployment areas tended to respond more strongly to the bonus than
did claimants in high unemployment areas.  We have defined low
unemployment as a 5 percent rate of total unemployment or lower,
since this is at or below the rate previously considered to be associated
with nonaccelerating inflation.18
That the bonus response appears to be greater in areas of low
unemployment suggests that the bonus offer is more effective when
increased search effort is more likely to generate additional job offers.
This is an issue of labor demand and appeals to the notion that, in a
labor market in which job prospects are neither good nor improving,
the bonus impact can be expected to be low.  That the bonus was effec-
tive in Illinois, where the unemployment rate was relatively high on
average, may be a result of the improving labor market in northern Illi-
nois during the experiment.  We return to this issue in Chapter 6, which
addresses the problems of interpreting the implications of experimental
results for policy implementation.
It was expected that because the earnings replacement rate is rela-
tively higher for those below the WBA maximum, the initial intensity
of job search would be correspondingly low, and the reemployment
bonus would have a greater impact.  There is no evidence from the
three experiments that claimants below the maximum WBA responded
more strongly to the bonus than did claimants at the maximum WBA.
In fact, in the Pennsylvania experiment (where the greatest difference
in impact between the two groups occurred), those at the maximum
WBA reduced weeks of insured UI by twice as much as those below
the maximum.
SUMMARY
Field experiments were conducted in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
Washington in the 1980s to test the theory that the average duration of
insured unemployment could be shortened if cash reemployment
bonuses were offered to unemployment insurance beneficiaries.
Claimants who were randomly assigned to treatment were told they
142 Decker, O’Leary, and Woodbury
would be given a lump sum cash payment if they started a new job by a
certain date and stayed working full time for at least four months.  In
each of the three experiments, a randomly selected control group was
compared with the various treatment groups.  
While the first experiment, conducted in Illinois, yielded very
encouraging results, the subsequent field tests provided less support
for the bonus idea.  The relatively weak response to the bonus offer in
Pennsylvania and Washington led to a reexamination of the powerful
Illinois results.  It was discovered that within the designed experiment,
a second experiment had unintentionally taken place.  In 1984 as Illi-
nois was recovering from a major recession, the availability of Federal
Supplemental Compensation was terminated.  This resulted in about
half of the claimants studied having 38 weeks of UI benefit eligibility,
with the remainder being eligible for only 26 weeks of regular UI ben-
efits.  It turns out that the mean bonus response of –1.15 weeks in Illi-
nois was made up of a response of –1.78 weeks for those FSC-eligible
and –0.54 weeks for those FSC-ineligible.  The average response of
–0.54 for the FSC-ineligible sample in Illinois is close to the response
observed in Pennsylvania and Washington where the entitled duration
of benefits was also similar.
Among the individual treatments, the impact on weeks of UI bene-
fits ranged from –0.05 for the low bonus/short qualification offer in
Washington to –1.78 for the bonus offer to FSC-eligible claimants in
Illinois.  Impacts for Pennsylvania tended to fall between those for Illi-
nois and Washington.  Overall a cash bonus can be expected to mod-
estly shorten spells of insured unemployment—the mean effect of the
offers made in the three states yielded about a one-half week reduction
in weeks of UI benefits.
Evidence from a sample created by pooling data from Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Washington indicated that either lengthening the
duration of the search period or increasing the bonus amount would
lead to a greater reduction in weeks of UI benefits collected.  Simula-
tions based on data pooled from the three experiments suggest that
offering a reemployment bonus with a $1,000 dollar amount, a 12-
week qualification period, and a four-month reemployment period
would result in an average reduction of 0.66 weeks of UI benefits. 
The degree of response to the bonus offer was also examined for
important subgroups within the sample.  Results from Pennsylvania
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and Washington suggest that UI claimants in low unemployment areas
and claimants whose prior employment was in manufacturing tended
to respond more strongly to the bonus.  However, close inspection of
subgroup results reveals one main finding: there is no difference
between any pair of subgroups shown that is both statistically signifi-
cant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three
experiments.  The implication of this finding is quite striking—the
reemployment bonus has a remarkably even impact on various sub-
groups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age, race, industrial
sector of employment, level of local unemployment, or level of the
weekly benefit amount.
Notes
1. Decker and O’Leary (1992) used the continuous variables model to analyze
pooled Pennsylvania and Washington data.  A summary article on the pooled anal-
ysis is Decker and O’Leary (1995).
2. One week was added in the computation of the qualification period in Washington
to adjust for the presence of a waiting week.  The waiting week is the first week
after filing for benefits that a claimant would otherwise be eligible for compensa-
tion.  It does not reduce total entitlement but does postpone payment, thereby dis-
couraging casual entry into the system.  The Washington experiment added a
week to the qualification period because the treatments were intended to have
qualification periods which were 20 and 40 percent of the compensable period.
3. The New Jersey UI reemployment experiment tested a declining bonus.  A similar
treatment was tried as part of the Pennsylvania experiment, but it is not reported in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 because it is not comparable to other treatments in Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.  The impact of the Pennsylvania declining bonus
offer, which started at 6 × WBA and declined by 10 percent of the original amount
per week, had insignificant point estimate of a 0.2 weeks reduction in UI benefits. 
4. See Chapter 6, p. 199, for an explanation of why the FSC-eligible and FSC-ineli-
gible responses differ.
5. Netter and Wasserman (1974, Chapter 22) give a concise discussion of covariance
analysis.
6. The effect of centering around the mean is that the intercept takes the value of the
outcome measure for a hypothetical person in the sample who was not exposed to
the experimental treatment and whose exogenous characteristics are at the mean
value for each of the characteristics across the total sample (control and experi-
mental groups combined).  Therefore, the control group means reported in Table
4.2 are slightly different from the unadjusted values given in Table 4.1.  Control
group means may also differ because sample sizes differ due to missing data on
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concomitant variables for some observations.  The treatment effect is the impact
of the treatment on the outcome measure for that hypothetical individual. 
7. The appendix table (Table A4.1) presents complete regression results for each
experiment from a model of weeks of UI benefits with a single treatment indicator
and all concomitant variables.  The full final project reports are Corson et al.
(1992) for Pennsylvania, Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992) for Washington,
and Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987) for Illinois.
8. Because of the upper limit on dollars and weeks of UI compensation, a type of
censoring is at work.  Tobit models which explicitly accounted for censoring were
therefore estimated.  Tobit models yielded virtually the same results as the ordi-
nary least squares models and are therefore not reported.  Since the outcome in the
exhaustion equation is a zero/one binary variable, a probit model for exhaustion
was estimated.  Again the results were extremely close to those computed by ordi-
nary least squares. 
9. The concomitant variables included when computing the estimates reported in
Table 4.3 were gender, age, race, previous industry, the WBA, entitled maximum
duration of benefits, base period earnings, work-search exempt status, enrollment
site, and (for Pennsylvania) the quarter of enrollment into the experiment.
10. In Pennsylvania, 10.6 percent of 8,864 bonus offers were paid; in Washington,
14.6 percent of 12,452 offers were paid. 
11. The mean WBA for the treatment-assigned beneficiaries was $166 in Pennsylva-
nia and $154 in Washington.  
12. While the design of the Illinois experiment prevents formal testing of differences
in the parameters across all three samples, the “two-sigma rule” suggests the
response is unchanged by adding the Illinois data since the parameter estimates
are within twice the standard error of those estimated on the combined Pennsylva-
nia and Washington data alone.  Formal analysis of variance tests were performed
by separately removing Pennsylvania and Washington from the full sample of
data combined from the three experiments, and the parameter estimates were not
found to be statistically different in either case.  These tests also provide some jus-
tification for the exercise of estimating a bonus response surface on pooled data.
13. Estimation of a quadratic response surface for the pooled sample suggested that,
for low dollar bonus amounts or very long qualification periods, the bonus could
lead to increased UI benefit durations.  The quadratic model included the dollar
bonus amount, weeks in the qualification period, the bonus amount squared, the
qualification period squared, and the bonus amount multiplied by the qualification
period along with the concomitant variables included in the linear continuous
variables model.  Results from the quadratic model suggest that Figure 4.2 is an
appropriate representation of response when the bonus amount is in the range
$700 to $1,700 and the qualification period is between 5 and 12 weeks.  The qua-
dratic model suggests the minimum response occurs for a bonus amount of $700
with a 9.7-week qualification period.
14. More formally, the cumulative exit rate is computed by what Kiefer (1988)
referred to as an integrated hazard function.  In the present application, the hazard
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function yields conditional UI exit rates which are not examined here since they
are subject to selection bias resulting from response to the bonus offer by treat-
ment group members.  The cumulative hazard is not subject to such bias since the
base for computation, the initial risk pool, does not change between periods.
15. The UI exit rates for the Illinois controls are roughly 50 to 70 percent of the UI
exit rates in Pennsylvania and roughly 40 to 60 percent of the UI exit rates in
Washington.
16. The concomitant variables, Z, included when performing subgroup impact estima-
tion were WBA, entitled duration of benefits, base period earnings, work-search
exemption status, an industry missing indicator, and five indicator variables for
the quarter of enrollment in Pennsylvania.
17. Treatment impacts for a particular subgroup were computed as the sum of the
parameter estimated on the product of the subgroup dummy variable and the treat-
ment indicator added to the sum of estimates of parameters on subgroup dummies
interacted with treatment indicators multiplied by their respective population
shares (i.e., the proportion of the population having that characteristic).  In each
computation, parameter estimates for the complement to the subgroup of interest
were omitted.  For example, expressing population shares as the expected value of
the subgroup dummy variables, E(G), the subgroup impacts would be computed
as ß + E(G)Ê, where ß and Ê are the least squares estimates of B and E from Equa-
tion 4.5.
18. Rosen and Quandt (1988, p. 54) estimated the nonaccelerating inflation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU) as 5.6 percent over the period 1932 to 1983, using a dis-
equilibrium model of the aggregate labor market and setting the inflation rate at 5
percent.
References
Corson, Walter, Paul Decker, Shari Dunstan, and Stuart Kerachsky.  1992.
Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration: Final Report.  Unem-
ployment Insurance Occasional Paper 92-1, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
Davidson, Carl, and Stephen A. Woodbury.  1991.  “Effects of a Reemploy-
ment Bonus under Differing Benefit Entitlements, or, Why the Illinois
Experiment Worked.”  Unpublished manuscript.  Kalamazoo, Michigan:
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Decker, Paul T., and Christopher J. O’Leary.  1992.  An Analysis of Pooled
Evidence from the Pennsylvania and Washington Reemployment Bonus
Demonstrations.  Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 92-7, Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training
Administration.
146 Decker, O’Leary, and Woodbury
______.  1995.  “Evaluating Pooled Evidence from the Reemployment Bonus
Experiments.”  Journal of Human Resources 30(3): 534–550.
Kiefer, Nicholas M.  1988.  “Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions.”
Journal of Economic Literature 26(2): 646–679.
Netter, John, and William Wasserman.  1974.  Applied Linear Statistical Mod-
els.  Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin.
O’Leary, Christopher J., Robert G. Spiegelman, and Kenneth J. Kline.  1995.
“Do Bonus Offers Shorten Unemployment Insurance Spells?  Results from
the Washington Experiment.”  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
14(2): 245–269.
Rosen, Harvey S., and Richard E. Quandt.  1988.  The Conflict between Equi-
librium and Disequilibrium Theories: The Case of the U.S. Labor Market.
Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Spiegelman, Robert G., Christopher J. O’Leary, and Kenneth J. Kline.  1992.
The Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment: Final Report.  Unem-
ployment Insurance Occasional Paper 92-6, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Robert G. Spiegelman.  1987.  “Bonuses to Work-
ers and Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illi-
nois.”  The American Economic Review 77(September): 513–530.
147
Appendix
Definitions of variables in Appendix Table A4.1.  Site indicators differ
acrossthe experiments (see site definitions below).
Site 1 - Illinois, Springfield South; Pennsylvania, Coatesville; Washington, Auburn
Site 2 - Illinois, Springfield North; Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (North); Washington, 
Renton
Site 3 - Illinois, Danville; Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (Uptown); Washington, 
Lynnwood
Site 4 - Illinois, Kankakee; Pennsylvania, Reading; Washington, North Seattle
Site 5 - Illinois, Rockford East; Pennsylvania, Lewistown; Washington, Rainier
Site 6 - Illinois, Rockford West; Pennsylvania, Butler; Washington, Everett
Site 7 - Illinois, Peoria; Pennsylvania, Connellsville; Washington, Bellevue
Site 8 - Illinois, Moline; Pennsylvania, McKeesport; Washington, Bellingham
Site 9 - Illinois, Galesburg; Pennsylvania, Erie; Washington, Bremerton
Site 10 - Illinois, West Town; Pennsylvania, Pittston; Washington, 
Mt. Vernon
Site 11 - Illinois, Mt. Prospect; Pennsylvania, Scranton; Washington, Olympia
Site12 - Illinois, Waukegon; Pennsylvania, Lancaster; Washington, Lewis County
Site 13 - Illinois, Villa Park; Washington, Aberdeen
Site 14 - Illinois, Aurora; Washington, Cowlitz County
Site 15 - Illinois, Woodlawn; Washington, Spokane
Intercept constant term
Treatment dummy variable 1 if treatment assigned, else zero
WBA weekly benefit amount
Female dummy variable 1 if female, else zero
AGELT35 dummy variable 1 if less than 35 years, else zero
AGEGT54 dummy variable 1 if greater than 54 years, else zero
Black dummy variable 1 if Black, else zero
Hispanic dummy variable 1 if Hispanic, else zero
Other non-White dummy variable 1 if not White, Black or Hispanic, else zero
Entitled duration Illinois, dummy 1 if 26 weeks; Pennsylvania, dummy one if 
15 weeks; Washington number of weeks of UI entitlement
BPE base period earnings
Manufacturing dummy variable 1 if prior job in manufacturing, else zero
SIC missing dummy variable 1 if SIC code missing, else zero
Search exempt dummy variable 1 if search exempt, else zero
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Site 16 - Illinois, South Chicago; Washington, Moses Lake
Site 17 - Illinois, Chicago Heights; Washington, Wenatchee
Site 18 - Illinois, Bedford Park; Washington, Yakima
Site 19 - Illinois, Chicago Hotel and Restaurant workers; Washington, Sunnyside
Site 20 - Illinois, Chicago Professional and Sales workers; Washington, 
Tri-cities
Site 21 - Illinois, Ravenswood; Washington, Walla Walla
Site 22 - Illinois, Evergreen Park 
Site missing - Illinois
NQ1 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in third quarter 1988
NQ2 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in fourth quarter 1988
NQ3 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in first quarter 1989
NQ4 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in second quarter 1989
NQ5 - enrolled in Pennsylvania in third quarter 1989
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Intercept 20.00** 0.19 14.91** 0.18 14.35** 0.19
Treatment –1.04** 0.26 –0.58** 0.21 –0.40* 0.21
WBA 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.03** 0.00
Female 0.38 0.27 1.04** 0.21 1.41** 0.19
AGELT35 –2.00** 0.28 –1.52** 0.21 –1.91** 0.18
AGEGT54 — — 3.19** 0.34 1.27** 0.31
Black 3.96** 0.40 –1.90** 0.39 1.77** 0.45
Hispanic 1.86** 0.57 –1.57** 0.55 –0.09 0.40
Other non-White 0.82 0.93 –1.81 1.25 –0.34 0.40
Entitled duration –2.83** 0.27 –1.82** 0.91 0.15** 0.02
BPE 0.08** 0.02 –0.07** 0.01 –0.03** 0.01
Manufacturing 0.68** 0.32 –0.48** 0.23 –1.61** 0.21
SIC missing 1.19** 0.42 0.16 0.34 0.87 1.98
Search exempt — — –0.60* 0.31 –3.77** 0.22
Site 1 –2.46** 0.86 –1.15** 0.52 –1.99** 0.95
Site 2 –2.15** 0.88 1.36** 0.49 –2.44** 0.97
Site 3 2.35** 0.87 — — –3.80** 0.99
Site 4 0.04 0.95 –1.75** 0.51 –1.36 0.95
Site 5 –0.25 1.01 0.38 0.59 –0.90 0.92
Site 6 –0.74 0.94 1.00* 0.54 –2.06** 0.96
Site 7 0.55 0.78 1.85** 0.55 –2.79** 0.96
Site 8 0.14 0.82 1.12** 0.52 –1.45 1.01
Site 9 1.15 1.45 0.60 0.52 –0.30 1.04
Site 10 0.44 0.80 1.83** 0.58 –2.03** 1.00
Site 11 –5.78** 0.68 –0.10 0.52 –0.60 1.01
Site 12 –1.08 0.95 –2.38** 0.52 –3.01** 1.08
Site 13 –2.85** 0.79 — — –1.10 1.05
Site 14 –2.74** 0.84 — — –3.45** 1.06
Site 15 –0.69 0.70 — — –0.69 0.94
Site 16 –0.16 0.67 — — –2.92** 1.05

















Site 18 0.40 0.71 — — –1.01 0.94
Site 19 2.30 3.41 — — –0.15 1.02
Site 20 0.02 0.70 — — –0.62 0.99
Site 21 –0.51 0.77 — — — —
Site missing 0.87 1.48 — — — —
NQ1 — — –2.13** 0.97 — —
NQ2 — — –1.44** 0.41 — —
NQ3 — — –1.98** 0.40 — —
NQ4 — — –1.80** 0.41 — —
NQ5 — — –1.49** 0.40 — —
Sample size 8,138 12,106 15,534
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